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Raven v. Deukmejian: A Modern Guide
to the Voter Initiative Process and State
Constitutional Independence
I. INTRODUCTION
In Raven v. Deukmejian,1 the California Supreme Court held that
a voters' initiative measure which purported to vest all judicial inter-
pretive power as to fundamental criminal defense rights in the
United States Supreme Court to be a revision of the California Con-
stitution. By holding that the measure constituted a revision as op-
posed to an amendment, the measure could not be proposed in the
initiative form by the sovereign people. Instead, the initiative had to
be sponsored by the legislature.2 Since this is only the second time in
modern history that the court has held an initiative to constitute a
revision,3 the analysis in Raven will have a profound impact on the
initiative process. The California court has indicated that in the fu-
ture it will strictly scrutinize any constitutional initiative that "sub-
stantially alters the preexisting constitutional scheme."4 In the fu-
ture, California courts will look to Raven as a modern guide to the
voter initiative process.
Raven is as much a case about state constitutional independence
as it is a case about the initiative process. By holding that mandatory
deference to the United States Supreme Court constitutes a revision,
the court in Raven has sent a strong message that state constitu-
tional independence is alive and well in California. The California
Supreme Court will stand firm against any attempt by the voters or
the legislature to limit the independent force and effect of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. The Raven court's holding protected the inde-
1. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990) (rehearing denied).
2. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII.
3. In McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 918 (1949), the court enjoined the vote on an initiative constitutional amendment
which would have repealed and replaced the bulk of the California Constitution. Al-
though there was no single-subject rule at the time, the court held that the provisions
were so extensive as to constitute an impermissible revision. Id. at 345-46, 196 P.2.d at
796-97. See also Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 P. 424 (1894).
4. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rtpr. at 338.
pendence of the State of California by preserving the intended pur-
pose of having separate constitutions for federal and state courts.
The purpose of this separation is to allow the state the right to offer




In June 1990, the voters of California adopted a variety of
changes and additions to the California Constitution and statutes by
adopting Proposition 115, an initiative measure. The various ele-
ments of Proposition 115 unite to form a comprehensive criminal re-
form package. The initiative addresses a significant number of differ-
ent aspects of the criminal justice system. Procedurally, Proposition
115 imposes restrictions on the rights of defendants during the dis-
covery stage,6 the preliminary examination stage,7 and the trial
stage.8 Substantively, the measure creates the new offense of torture,
and also revises the felony-murder and special circumstances statute
to achieve more severe punishment for criminal defendants whose
offense or conduct falls within those provisions.9
The section of Proposition 115 that has the greatest impact is sec-
tion 3 of the initiative which amended article I, section 24 of the
state constitution. Previously, this portion of the constitution pro-
vided that rights therein guaranteed were not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 10 Proposition 115
modified this constitutional provision, providing that with respect to
a number of enumerated rights of criminal defendants, those rights
are to be construed in a manner consistent with and limited by the
United States Constitution." Further, the initiative mandated that
the state constitution is not to afford criminal defendants greater
rights than are afforded under the federal constitution.12
5. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (affirming the au-
thority of states, in the exercise of police power or sovereign right, to adopt in their own
constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the federal
Constitution).
6. Allowing reciprocal discovery and codifying discovery rules. STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA, PRIMARY ELECTION PAMPHLET, Proposition 115, § 30(c), at 65 (1990) [herein-
after Proposition 115].
7. Prohibiting postindictment preliminary hearings and allowing the use of heat-
say testimony at preliminary hearings. Id. § 30(b), at 33.
8. Promoting joinder and limiting severance, restricting voir dire by counsel, regu-
lating appointment of counsel, and limiting continuances. Id. § 30, at 65.
9. Id. § 9, at 66.
10. "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 24.
I1. Proposition 115, supra note 6, § 3, at 33.
12. Id.
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B. The Initiative Process
The initiative process allows "people to propose bills and laws, and
to enact or reject them at the polls, independent of legislative assem-
bly."' 3 The citizens of California frequently use their power of initia-
tive,14 often making sweeping changes in the powers and duties of
the government and of the people. 15 This power of initiative is sub-
ject to various requirements that must be met in order for the initia-
tive to be found valid. After drafting an initiative measure, the pro-
ponents submit it to the Attorney General who reviews its form and
prepares the petition to be circulated.' 6 The proponents then circu-
late the petitions and obtain the requisite number of voters' signa-
tures.17 A state official subsequently verifies the signatures col-
lected.1 8 At some point during this process, the Office of the
Attorney General prepares a title and summary, which appear on
both the petition and the ballot."9 Aside from the form and title re-
quirements, there are requirements that the initiative consist of one
subject" only and not amount to a revision of the constitution.2
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 401 (5th ed. 1983).
14. The power of initiative, currently CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8, was adopted in
1911.
15. For example, see the comprehensive tax limitation adopted in 1978, CAL.
CONsT. art. XIIIA ("Proposition 13"), and the comprehensive governmental spending
limitation adopted in 1979, CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIB ("Proposition 4").
16. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3502 (West 1977).
17. See CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(b); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3524 (West Supp. 1991)
(requiring eight percent of votes cast in the prior gubernatorial election to qualify initia-
tive constitutional amendments, and five percent to qualify an initiative statute).
18. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3520(d) (West Supp. 1991). When petitions are submitted
for verification by state officials, these items are checked against voter registration
records. The clerk will use a random sampling technique, as determined by the Secretary
of State, for verification of the signatures. Id. at § 3521(b).
19. Id. at § 3502.
20. The California Constitution expressly states that no initiative may contain
more than one subject. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
21. Amador Valley Joint Unified High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 221, 583 P.2d 1281, 1284, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242 (1978) (holding that
Proposition 13, amending Art. XIIIA of the California Constitution, imposing limitations
upon the assessment and taxing powers of the state and local governments, was a consti-
tutional amendment, not a revision, and thus could be enacted by initiative).
III. THE CHALLENGE: RAVEN V. DEUKMEJIAN
In Raven v. Deukmejian,2 2 petitioners23 challenged the validity of
Proposition 115, contending that it violated the single subject rule24
and the rule requiring constitutional "revisions" ' 25 to be accomplished
by more formal procedures than are required for mere constitutional
initiative measures.2 Opponents of Proposition 115 petitioned the
court of appeal for a writ of mandate or prohibition, and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's motion to trans-
fer the case, concluding that the issues of this case were of great
public importance and required prompt resolution.2
The California Supreme Court held that the provisions of Proposi-
tion 115, though somewhat disparate, reflected a consistent theme or
purpose to nullify particular decisions and statutes of the criminal
justice system. Therefore, the initiative was not a violation of the
single subject rule.28 However, the court also held that, with respect
to the change made to article I, section 24, which required certain
criminal defendants' rights to be construed consistent with the
United States Constitution, the effect of the measure would be so
far-reaching as to amount to a qualitative constitutional revision be-
yond the scope of the initiative process.2 9 The invalidation of section
3 of Proposition 115 did not affect the remaining provisions, because
Proposition contained a severance clause.30 The court concluded that
by applying Proposition 115's severability clause, the remaining por-
tions of the measure were valid.3 '
22. 52 Cal.3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
23. Petitioners were taxpayers and voters asserting a challenge to the manner in
which Proposition 115 was presented to the voters.
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. "Although '[t]he electors may amend the Constitution by initiative' (CAL,
CONsr. art. XVIII, § 3), a 'revision' of the Constitution may be accomplished only by
convening a constitutional convention and obtaining popular ratification (Id. at § 2), or
by legislative submission of the measure to the voters (Id. at § 1)." Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at
349, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (1990).
26. Id. at 340, 801 P.2d at 1079, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
27. Id. At the outset, the court was careful to note that its opinion was directed to
the manner in which the initiative was presented to the voters, not to other possible
attacks that might be directed at the various substantive and procedural changes accom-
plished by the measure. Id. at 340-41, 801 P.2d at 1079, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 328. Simi-
larly, the court did not consider interpretive or analytical questions likely to arise later.
Id. at 340-41, 801 P.2d at 1079-80, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
28. Id. at 348-49, 801 P.2d at 1084, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
29. Id. at 354-55, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
30. "If any provision of this measure or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applica-
tions of the measure which can be given effect without the invalid provision or applica-
"tion, and to this end the provisions of this measure are severable." Proposition 115, supra
note 6; § 29, at 69. A severability clause allows the remaining portion of a proposition to
maintain its validity even though a portion of the bill has been struck by the court.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 714 (5th ed. 1983).
31. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 356, 801 P.2d at 1089-90, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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A. Single Subject Rule
The California Supreme Court first addressed the contention that
Proposition 115 violated the single subject rule. Under the California
Constitution, "[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one sub-
ject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect. '3 2 In its
discussion of the single subject rule, the court relied on the analysis
it used in Brosnah'an v. Brown.3 3 According to Brosnahan, "an initi-
ative measure does not violate the single-subject requirement 'if, de-
spite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are "reasonably ger-
mane" to each other,' and to the general purpose or object of the
initiative." 34
In Brosnahan,5 the court held that, despite the measure's varied
topics, it was readily apparent that it met the 'reasonably germane'
standard. Since "[e] ach of [its] several facets bears a common con-
cern, 'general object' or 'general subject,' promoting the rights of
actual or potential crime victims," this goal constitutes a readily dis-
cernible common thread which unites all of the initiative's provisions
32. CAL. CONST., art. II, § 8 (d). There are two purposes behind this requirement.
The first is to prevent voter confusion. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 231, 583 P.2d 1281, 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239,
249 (1978). The second purpose is prevention of logrolling, which is the combination of
several propositions within a single initiative. A logrolling measure could receive majority
approval when some of the component measures would not have been approved if submit-
ted individually. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 250, 651 P.2d 274, 282, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 30, 38 (1982). Thus, the single-subject rule protects voters from implicitly approv-
ing laws or constitutional amendments of which they are unaware, or of which they dis-
approve, in pursuit of others which they desire.
33. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30. In Brosnahan, a "single-
subject rule" challenge was raised to Proposition 8 - a multi-farious criminal justice re-
form initiative quite similar in purpose, scope and effect to Proposition 115. Proposition 8
called for a variety of constitutional and statutory provisions and amendments, including:
a right to restitution by crime victims; an "inalienable right" to safeschools; a "truth-in-
evidence" provision which essentially abrogates most of the state's evidentiary exclusion-
ary rules; restrictions on bail; unlimited use of prior convictions for impeachment or sen-
tence enhancement purposes; abolition of the diminished capacity defense; sentence en-
hancement for habitual criminals; consideration at sentencing of statements of crime
victim or their families; limitations on bargaining; restrictions on commitment to the
California Youth Authority; and repeal of provisions governing mentally disordered sex
offenders. Id. at 242-45, 651 P.2d at 277-79, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 33-35.
34. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 346, 801 P.2d at 1083, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (quoting
Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 245, 651 P.2d at 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (emphasis in origi-
nal)). See also Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1989); Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 742 P.2d 1290, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1987); Fair Political Practices Comm. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599
P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979).
35. See supra note 33.
36. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
in advancing its common purpose. ' '
The court felt that Brosnahan was controlling in Raven because
"[a]s with [the measure in issue], the various elements of Proposi-
tion 115 unite to form a comprehensive criminal justice reform pack-
age." '  As in Brosnahan, Proposition 115 was "designed to
strengthen procedural and substantive safeguards for victims in our
criminal justice system. ' ' 9
The court also noted that a unifying theme of Proposition 115 was
the abrogation of particular holdings of the court that, in the view of
the proposition's framers, were "unduly expansive of criminal de-
fendants' rights."40 Again, Brosnahan applied because "[iun our
democratic society in the absence of some compelling, overriding
constitutional imperative, we should not prohibit the sovereign peo-
ple from either expressing or implementing their own will on matters
of such direct and immediate importance to them as their own per-
ceived safety.""' Thus, although Proposition 115 appears to contain
disparate provisions, these provisions were held to reflect a consistent
theme or purpose of promoting rights of actual or potential crime
victims and of nullifying particular judicial decisions affecting vari-
ous aspects of the criminal justice system.42 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Proposition 115 did not violate the single subject require-
ment of the California Constitution.43
B. Constitutional Revision or Amendment
Petitioners' second major contention was that Proposition 115
amounted to a constitutional revision rather than simply an amend-
37. Id.
38. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347, 801 p.2d at 1083, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33.
39. Id. (quoting Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
36); see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text and supra note 28.
40. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347, 801 P.2d at 803, 276 Cal. Rptr. 332-33. Examples
given were the restrictions on postindictment preliminary hearings (Hawkins v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978)) and the changes in
special circumstances statutes (People v. Spears, 33 Cal. 3d 279, 655 P.2d 1289, 188
Cal. Rptr. 454 (1983)).
41. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347-48, 801 P.2d at 1084, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (quoting
Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 248, 651 P.2d at 281, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 37).
42. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347-48, 801 P.2d at 1084, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
43. Id. at 349, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The court rejected an
argument that the broad diversity of the initiative's provision suggested logrolling. Id. at
348-49, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334. The court also rejected contentions that
the diversity of the provisions was a challenge to voters' sophistication or that effectuat-
ing Proposition 115 would cause delays and soaring financial costs. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at
349, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
Justice Mosk concurred on the revision issue but argued that the measure should have
been invalidated in its entirety as violative of the single-subject rule. Id. at 356, 801 P.2d
at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 339. "The single-subject rule establishes. . . a requirement of
substance rather than label. . . ." Id. at 360, 801 P.2d at 1093, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 342
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ment." "Although '[t]he electors may amend the constitution by ini-
tiative,' a 'revision' of the constitution may be accomplished only by
convening a constitutional convention and obtaining popular ratifica-
tion, or by submitting' the measure to the voters through the legisla-
ture. '45 In contrast to the single subject requirement, which is in-
tended to protect the voters from confusion and deception, 46 the
nonrevision requirement is based on the theory that comprehensive
changes in the state's fundamental law require more discussion and
deliberation than is available through the- initiative process .4 Thus,
even the most simple and clearly worded initiative proposing a con-
stitutional amendment might constitute a revision.48
Petitioners' argument focused on section 3 of Proposition 115,
which would amend article I, section 24 of the state constitution re-
lating to the independent nature of certain rights guaranteed by the
constitution. Article I, section 24 provides that "Rights guaranteed
by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United states Constitution. 49 Proposition 115 would change this and
prevent California from offering greater rights than those afforded to
criminal defendants by the United States Constitution. Proposition
115 called for California to construe rights of criminal defendants in
a manner consistent with the federal constitution. Petitioners
44. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 349, 801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
45. Id. (citing CAL. CONsT. art. XVIII).
46. See supra note 32.
47. "[R]evision contemplates deliberative action of either the Legislature or a con-
vention duly assembled in order to accomplish harmony in language and purpose between
articles and to produce as nearly as possible a document free of doubts and inconsisten-
cies." Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 829 (Fla. 1970).
48. "[A]n enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature
would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the
measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such change." Amador
Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 223,
583 P.2d 1281, 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (1978).
49. CAL. CONsT. art I, § 24.
50. "In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the
laws, to due process of the law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally
present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of
witnesses, to confront the witness against him or her, to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against
himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and
not to suffer the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed
in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This Consti-
tution shall not be construed by the courts of this state to afford greater rights
to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United
States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in juvenile
proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the
United States."
claimed that Proposition 115 "ha[d] in essence 'vested' or 'delegated'
all judicial interpretive power respecting [the criminal defendants'
rights listed] in or to the federal courts." 51
1. What Constitutes a Revision?
California courts have established that inappropriate or extensive
changes in the constitution could constitute a revision.5 2 The court
has incorporated this principle into a quantitative-qualitative test
that measures the effects the proposition will have on the constitu-
tional scheme. 53
Quantitatively, Proposition 115 does not constitute a revision.""
Proposition 115 is "not so extensive . . . as to change the 'substan-
tial entirety' of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of nu-
merous existing provisions. . . ."I, The measure does not delete any
constitutional language and only affects one article.50 Therefore, the
court found that the measure is no more extensive than those
presented in previous cases that upheld initiative measures chal-
lenged as revisions. 57
Qualitatively, however, Proposition 115 does constitute a revi-
sion,5 8 which was prohibited by the court in Brosnahan.
[E]ven a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision also .... /Ain enactment which purported to vest all judicial
power in the legislature would amount to a revision without regard either
to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of existing arti-
cles or sections affected by such change.59
Proposition 115 sought to cause this similar type of qualitative
change. The change in article I, section 24., would vest all judicial
Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 350, 801, P.2d at 1086, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (1990) (quoting
Proposition 115).
51. Id. at 351, 801 P.2d at 1086, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (1990) (emphasis in
original).
52. See supra note 3.
53. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244. (followed
in Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 260, 651 P.2d 274, 288, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 44
(1982)).
54. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 351, 801 P.2d at 1086-87, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
55. Id. (citing Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at
244).
56. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 351, 801 P.2d at 1086-87, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
57. Id. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 260, 651 P.2d at 288, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 44(upholding measure affecting only CAL. CONST. art. I); Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 224, 583
P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245 (upholding measure affecting only a few articles
dealing with taxation). Cf. McFadden v. Jordon, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 334-35, 196 P.2d 787,
790 (1948) (invalidating measure adding 21,000 words to Constitution and affecting 15
of its 25 articles).
58. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354-55, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
59. Id. at 352, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (quoting Amador, 22 Cal.
3d at 223, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244) (emphasis added by Raven).
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interpretive power, as to fundamental criminal rights, in the United
States Supreme Court. 0
2. Effects of a Constitutional Revision
Under Section 3 of Proposition 115, California courts would no
longer be able to interpret the state constitution in a manner more
protective of defendants' rights than the federal Constitution, as in-
terpreted by the United States Supreme Court." The California
court described an extreme hypothetical illustrating the possible re-
sults of such a scheme. For example, if the United States Supreme
Court held that public torture or maiming of a defendant convicted
of a misdemeanor did not violate the "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" clause of the federal constitution, then the California courts
would be compelled to agree and impose such punishment.12 The
protection of criminal defendants against violations of their constitu-
tional rights would be left in the hands of the United States Su-
preme Court. 3
This makes it seem as though state courts do not have autonomy
in regards to interpreting laws. "In effect, [Proposition 115] would
substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state constitu-
tion as a document of independent force and effect."6 The court
acknowledged that the idea of deferring to the federal high court
was not nev 5 but remarked: "It is one thing voluntarily to defer to
high court decisions, but quite another to mandate the state courts'
blind obedience thereto despite 'cogent reasons,' 'independent state
interests' or 'strong countervailing circumstances' that might lead
our courts to construe similar state constitutional language differ-
ently from the federal approach." 66
60. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 352, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
61. Id. Decisions of the lower federal courts interpreting federal law; though per-
suasive, are not binding on the state courts. People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 86, 460 P.2d
129, 132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (1969).
62. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 352, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
63. Id. The court pointed out that another problem was that "the nature and ex-
tent of state constitutional guarantees would remain uncertain and underdeveloped unless
and until the high court had spoken and clarified the federal constitutional law." Id.
(emphasis in original).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 353, 801 P.2d at 1088, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 337. "[C]ogent reasons must
exist before a state court in construing a provision of the state Constitution will depart
from the construction placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar
provision in the federal Constitution." Id. (quoting Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal.
2d 85, 89, 82 P.2d 391, 393 (1938)).
66. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353, 801 P.2d at 1088, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
California courts presently do have the authority to adopt an inde-
pendent interpretation of the state constitution. Article I, section 24
states, "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on
those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 6 7 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court sits "as the court of last resort [in interpreting
constitutional guarantees], subject only to the qualification that our
interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national
citizenry under the federal charter. 68 Thus, California courts may
grant criminal defendants greater rights than those granted by the
United States Constitution. However, Proposition 115 would impose
deference as a matter of constitutional imperative for the first time
in the state's history. 9
It substantially alters the preexisting constitutional scheme or framework
heretofore extensively and repeatedly used by courts in interpreting and en-
forcing state constitutional protections. It directly contradicts the well-es-
tablished jurisprudential principle, 'that the judiciary, from the very nature
of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right
to construe the Constitution in the last resort'. ... 71
The court found that Proposition 115 was too fundamental a change
in the preexisting governmental plan to be made through the initia-
tive process. 71 Therefore, section 3 of Proposition 115 represented an
invalid revision of the California Constitution. 2
IV. IMPLICATIONS
By holding Proposition 115 to constitute a revision, the court in
Raven effectively denied the power of the people to enact their will
to limit judicial power through the initiative process. However,
Raven does not stand for the proposition that any time the voters
express their will to limit the power of the court, the enactment will
be deemed a revision. The court will only find the measure to consti-
tute a revision when broad fundamental changes in the governmental
plan are the result of the measure. Raven will now be the standard
by which future challenges to the initiative process will be reviewed.
Once the measure is deemed to be a revision, only the legislature
may enact the initiative. However, even if the measure proposed in
Proposition 115 was initiated by the legislature, it probably would
violate the doctrine of state constitutional independence. State con-
stitutional independence, a doctrine heavily relied upon in Raven, al-
67. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 24 (adopted in 1974).
68. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354, 801 P.2d at 1088-89, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
(quoting People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951, n.4, 583 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975)).
69. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 354, 801 P.2d at 1088-89, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
70. Id. (quoting Norgues v. Douglas, 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 (1858)).
71. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 355, 801 P.2d at 1089, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
72. Id.
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lows the state court to interpret the state constitution in a way that
permits the court to allow greater rights than those guaranteed by
the federal Constitution. 3 Any broad attack on state constitutional
independence by the voters or the legislature will probably be found
unconstitutional. In Raven, the broad attack on state constitutional
independence was that Proposition 115 deprived the state judiciary
of its fundamental power to decide cases by independently interpret-
ing provisions of the state constitution.74 Therefore, Raven is an im-
portant case for determining the type of initiative the legislature
may propose while the doctrine of state constitutional independence
is in effect.
A. What Is Left of the Voters' Initiative Process After Raven?
According to the California Constitution, "the people reserve to
themselves the power of initiative and referendum." ' It is the duty
of the judiciary "to zealously guard" the sovereign people's initiative
process because it is "one of the most precious rights of [the] demo-
cratic process." 6 Yet, in Raven, the court refused to enforce an initi-
ative in which the sovereign people expressed their will on a matter
of great importance to them. By holding that Proposition 115 consti-
tuted a revision, as opposed to an amendment, the court precluded
the people from expressing their will to restrict judicial power. A
concern that arises is whether any time the people try to restrict
judicial power, the court will hold the initiative to constitute a
revision.
Such a concern is unwarranted. For example, in In re Lance W.,77
the court upheld a provision limiting the state exclusionary rule for
search and seizure violations to the boundaries fixed by the fourth
amendment to the federal Constitution. In People v. Frierson,8 the
court upheld a provision which, in essence, required California courts
deciding capital cases to apply the state's "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" clause consistently with the federal Constitution. In both
cases, the court deferred to the United States Supreme Court. How-
ever, these cases can be reconciled with Raven.
73., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See supra note 5.
74. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 352-55, 801 P.2d at 1086-89,. 276 Cal. Rptr. at 335-38.
75. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
76. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259 (1978).
77. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
78. 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
Both Lance W. and Frierson concluded that no constitutional revi-
sion was involved because the isolated provision at issue in both cases
achieved no far-reaching, fundamental change in the governmental
plan. In contrast to Raven, neither Lance W. nor Frierson involved a
broad attack on the state court's authority to exercise independent
judgment in construing a wide spectrum of important rights under
the California Constitution. Proposition 115, on the other hand,
would create far-reaching fundamental changes in the preexisting
governmental plan by vesting a critical portion of state judicial
power in the United States Supreme Court. Thus, Raven has not
destroyed the people's sovereign right to impose restrictions on the
judiciary. Only when those restrictions are such broad and funda-
mental changes that they amount to a revision will the people lose
this right.
Allowing the judiciary to review the possibility that a voter initia-
tive constitutes a revision is necessary because of inherent flaws in
the initiative process. In order for the initiative process to work prop-
erly, voters must be informed. Lack of knowledge and interest in the
initiative measure will prevent rational voting.79 Many times the sub-
ject matter and language of the initiative are so complex or lengthy
that it may never be thoroughly read or completely understood.
This is not to say that the court should fall prey to the elitist argu-
ment that most people do not know what is best for them and there-
fore need someone else to provide direction. Instead, the court must
adhere to the principle that initiative provisions of the constitution
should be broadly construed so as to maintain the power of the peo-
ple.80 However, on occasion, the court must, as in Raven, step in and
review the constitutionality of a voters' initiative. So far, the court
has not abused this power. Raven marks only the second time in
modern history that the court has found a voter's initiative to consti-
tute a revision."'
B. State Constitutional Independence
Raven is as much a case about state constitutional independence
as it is a case about the initiative process. The California Constitu-
tion is a document of independent force and the California Supreme
Court is the final interpreter of the meaning of that document.82 Be-
cause United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Bill of
79. Brestoff, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S.
CAL. L. REV. 922, 934 (1975).
80. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 341, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 326, 329 (1990). "The initiative power must be liberally construed ... to promote
the democratic process." Id.
81. See supra note 3.
82. 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 90 (9th ed. 1988).
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Rights and the fourteenth amendment mark the minimum guaran-
tees of individual rights, state courts that give truly independent
force to their own constitutions generally reach decisions which pro-
vide more protection of citizens' rights than Supreme Court rul-
ings."8 California has led the nation in the development of indepen-
dent interpretation.8 4
A definitive statement of California's willingness to give indepen-
dent force of its own constitution was given in People v. Brisendine,85
which held that a warrantless search by deputy sheriffs was invalid
under California precedents, despite its possible validity under
United States Supreme Court decisions. The court found that
the California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of indepen-
dent force. Any other result would contradict not only the most fundamen-
tal principles of federalism but also the historic basis of state charters. It is
fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually iden-
tical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart.
The lesson of history is otherwise; the Bill of Rights was based upon the
corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the
reverse.
86
By granting California citizens greater protection under the Califor-
nia Constitution from unlawful search and seizures, the court was
not "embarking" on a revolutionary course," but, instead, the court
was "reaffirming a basic principle of federalism. 87 The court in
Raven relied on this precedent to support is authority to indepen-
dently interpret the California Constitution. 8
The court in Raven not only found support for its authority to
83. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
84. For example, California adopted the exclusionary rule for illegal search and
seizure six years before the Supreme Court made it binding on the states. People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). California invalidated the death penalty
four months before the United States Supreme Court. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,
493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 153, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). Also, in the area of
equal protection, the California Supreme Court has declared education a fundamental
interest in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977), and found, contrary to the United States Supreme Court,
that sex is a suspect classification. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
85. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). Defendant was
arrested for the citation offense of building a campfire in a restricted area. Id. at 533,
531 P.2d at 1101, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 317. The police officer opened defendant's knapsack,
removed several opaque bottles and envelopes, and confiscated drugs contained therein.
Id. at 533, 531 P.2d at 1102, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
86. Id. at 549-50, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
87. Id. at 551-52, 531 P.2d at 113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
88. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353, 801 P.2d at 1087, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 337 (1990).
adopt an independent interpretation of the state constitution from
case law, but also found support in the "current" article I, section 24
of the state constitution.89 The section, adopted in 1974, reads,
"[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution." However, the court
in Brisendine was quick to point out that "this declaration of consti-
tutional independence did not originate at the recent election; indeed
the voters were told the provision was a mere reaffirmation of ex-
isting law." 91 In subsequent cases, the California Supreme Court has
reiterated that the provision was simply a reaffirmation of existing
law.92
Perhaps the most that can be said is that "current" article I, sec-
tion 24 represents a public ratification of the court's past decisions
that independently interpret the California Constitution. Thus, "cur-
rent" article I, section 24 does not grant any additional power to the
court in Raven. This is important because it shows that state consti-
tutional independence is inherent in the document and not specifi-
cally granted by one article. If state constitutional independence is
inherent in the constitution, then it is a question whether the legisla-
ture can, by use of a constitutional convention, initiate a measure
that will vest all judicial interpretive power, as relating to criminal
defendants' rights, in the United States Supreme Court.
1. Effects of Inherent State Constitutional
Independence
The court in Raven held that the "proposed" article I, section 24
constituted a revision and, therefore, could only be changed by con-
vening a constitutional convention and obtaining popular ratification,
or by submitting the measure to the voters through the legislature. 3
One can ask whether the legislature can revise the state constitution
to eliminate state constitutional independence, when state constitu-
tional independence is inherent in the state constitution. In other
words, one can ask whether the legislature can adopt a legislative
initiative similar to the "proposed" article I, section 24.
The answer must be the same for legislative initiatives as it is for
voters' initiatives.94 Even though the court in Raven found that the
"proposed" article I, section 24 constituted a revision, the legislature,
likewise, will not be able to adopt such a fundamental change in the
89. Id.
90. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (emphasis added).
91. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 551, 531 P.2d at 114, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
92. See, e.g., People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 939 n.10, 583 P.2d 237, 245 n.10,
123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 117 n.10 (1975).
93. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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governmental scheme. If the legislature were to mandate the state
court to defer to the United States Supreme Court on issues of fun-
damental rights of criminal defendants, it would usurp the powers of
the judiciary. Any broad attempt by the legislature to alter funda-
mental judicial power would be found unconstitutional, for "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.''95
2. State Constitutional Independence: Necessary or
Repugnant?
The United States Supreme Court has squarely confronted and
accepted the fact that a state may grant its citizens rights greater
than those they have under the federal Constitution. 6 No one ques-
tions the right of the state courts to engage in independent interpre-
tation; rather, the debate thus far has focused primarily on the pro-
priety of such interpretations. One must ask whether state
constitutional independence is such a pernicious doctrine in light of
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' retreat from some of the Warren
Court's interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights. One only has to
look to the trend in recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of
criminal procedure to determine how important it is to invalidate the
type of initiative challenged in Raven. For example, recently, the
United States Supreme Court held that a coerced admission of guilt
could be used if it amounts to a "harmless error."'97
This is not to say that the United States Supreme Court is wrong
in interpreting the federal Constitution, but "lilt is simply that the
decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of ques-
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
96. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See supra note 5.
97. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). Within the last two decades,
rights guaranteed under the fourth amendment have been severely limited. For example,
the Supreme Court has found the warrant requirement plainly appearing in the text of
the fourth amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before arrest,
however easy it might have been to get an arrest warrant. United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976). It has declined to read the fourth Amendment to prohibit search of an
individual by police officers following a stop for a traffic violation, even though there
exists no probable cause to believe the individual has committed any other legal infrac-
tion. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The Court has held permissible
searches grounded upon consent regardless of whether the consent was knowing and in-
telligent. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973). Even when the Court has found searches to violate fourth amendment
rights, it has occasionally declared widesweeping exceptions to exclusionary rule and al-
lowed the use of such evidence. E.g., United States v. Janis, 831 F.2d 773, cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1073 (1988).
tions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law." '98 If one disagrees with these Supreme Court decisions, at least
one can take comfort in the fact that the independent nature of the
California Constitution will allow the California courts "to sepa-
rately define and protect the rights of California citizens despite con-
flicting decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
the federal Constitution."99 If one believes that state constitutional
independence is a necessary doctrine, then, one must believe that
Raven is a good decision because it has shown that the California
courts will not be forced to blindly follow the federal courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Raven v. Deukmejian held that a voters' initiative measure which
purported to vest all judicial interpretive power as to fundamental
criminal defense rights amounted to a revision of the state Constitu-
tion. The implications of that decision are two-fold. First, the deci-
sion will have an impact on the way future courts review constitu-
tional challenges to the initiative process. The Raven court has made
it perfectly clear that a constitutional initiative which "substantially
alters the preexisting constitutional scheme" will be subject to strict
scrutiny by the court. The court has acknowledged the important
constitutional limits on the initiative process.
Second, the decision has reaffirmed the court's position on state
constitutional independence. The court will not give up its constitu-
tional right to interpret the state.constitution and will not act as a
rubber stamp for the federal courts. Instead, the state constitution
will govern in a manner consistent with the interpretations of the
California Supreme Court.
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